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Forced Sterilization of Trans People in Japan 
 
March 7, 2019 
by Nicholas Ripley 
It is very difficult to be transgender in Japan, legally speaking. One must be at least twenty years 
old, unmarried, and without children under the age of twenty. One must undergo a psychiatric 
evaluation to receive a diagnosis of “Gender Identity Disorder,” a sex reassignment surgery, and 
mandatory sterilization. This is to say nothing about the social, emotional, and physical safety 
difficulties of being trans in the country. 
In 2003, Japan passed Law No. 111, which instated formidable hurdles for transgender people 
who seek government recognition of their gender. This law is restricted to recognition of the two 
binary genders but does allow for correction of the gender assigned at birth. Since 
2003, approximately seven thousand people have complied with these invasive procedures and 
requirements in order to legally change their gender registration. On January 24, 2019, Japan’s 
Supreme Court unanimously affirmed Law No. 111 after Takakito Usui, a trans man, challenged 
the law as unconstitutional. 
This comes after significant advances for LGBTQ people in Japan. Recent polling has found that 
over seventy percent of respondents support stronger legal protections for LGBT people. More 
respondents than ever openly identified as lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender in the survey. 
This change in public attitude is being resisted by conservative lawmakers like Mio Sugita, who 
belongs to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. She attracted widespread criticism last year when 
she published an article in the Japan Times saying, “Support for LGBTs has gone too far.” 
For trans people, not having your correct gender recognized by the state can have dangerous 
implications. In Japan, if you have not gone through the official gender recognition process and 
become incarcerated, you will be placed in a prison with the gender you were assigned at birth—
which can result in targeted violence, sexual assault, and death. As noted by the Secretariat in the 
2016 Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, governments’ refusal to legally recognize transgender people’s 
appropriate gender “leads to grave consequences for the enjoyment of their human rights, 
including obstacles to accessing education, employment, health care and other essential 
services.” However, in recognizing trans people’s gender, governments have a responsibility not 
to impose abusive requirements, such as “forced or otherwise involuntary gender reassignment 
surgery, sterilization or other coercive medical procedures.” 
In Japan, Gender Identity Disorder (a mandatory diagnostic prerequisite for trans people) is 
defined as “a person, despite his/her biological sex being clear, who continually maintains a 
psychological identity with an alternative gender, who holds the intention to physically and 
socially conform to an alternative gender.”  The sex reassignment surgery, which Law 111 
requires, is invasive and complies with binary gender standards. The law also requires trans 
people’s gonads to be either removed or rendered permanently nonfunctioning. These 
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requirements are based on beliefs that trans people, if not surgically altered and psychologically 
pathologized, cause “problems” with children and society at large. 
This coercive sterilization violates the rights to physical integrity, health, privacy, and family life 
(including the right to decide the number and spacing of children), as well as the right to non-
discrimination, as protected by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In some 
cases, it may even constitute torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. 
There are currently no explicit protections for LGBTQ people in binding international law. 
Language dealing with gender in binding international law is actively compliant with binary 
notions of sex in order to avoid controversy (the Rome Statute goes out of its way to define 
gender as “two sexes, male and female”). This leads to the exclusion of transgender 
individuals from legal protection in international law. Likewise, there are no explicit prohibitions 
on involuntary sterilization in international law, despite the fact that the practice has ties to 
eugenics and primarily affects marginalized people like women, impoverished people, people 
living with HIV, people with disabilities, minority and indigenous people, and transgender and 
intersex people. 
Despite the lack of binding international law, many in the field have made efforts to extend 
penumbral human rights law to include implied protections for LGBTQ people through 
nonbinding declarations and general guidance decisions. These legal theories (that LGBTQ 
discrimination is inherently prohibited under international law) have yet to be tested in 
international court. Possibly because, without stronger doctrine in international law, parties are 
concerned about losing and creating detrimental implications for future cases. International 
organizations like the UN need to take a stronger stance on LGBTQ rights. They could start by 
acknowledging the existence of LGBTQ people in binding international conventions. For its part, 
Japan could support its transgender citizens by removing the burdensome requirements needed to 
legally change one’s gender and offering recognition of a third gender identification for non-









A Culture of Impunity Still Lies Behind 
Kyrgyzstan’s Bride Kidnapping Epidemic  
 
March 14, 2019 
by Gina Uyghur 
The brutal murder of Turdaaly Kyzy sparked protests against the Kyrgyz cultural practice 
of bride kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan. On May 27, 2018, a twenty-nine-year-old man abducted 
twenty-year-old medical student Burulai Turdaaly Kyzy to force her into marriage. After 
police detained and recklessly left them alone in a room together, the man fatally stabbed her. 
Concurrently, Kyrgyz state TV has been justifying domestic violence and bride kidnapping in a 
high-profile drama series, which features a Kyrgyz woman who is abducted and forced to marry 
against her will but later chooses to stay with her kidnapper. 
Kyrgyzstan is considered one of the most problematic countries in the world in terms of the 
frequency of forced marriages. Between ten to thirty women are kidnapped every day. Most of 
them are forced to marry their captor for fear of social stigma or condemnation from family 
members. These figures reveal a profound sickness at the heart of Kyrgyz society when it comes 
to marriage. Despite the public outcry and the UN Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women’s recommendation in 2015, urging Kyrgyzstan to raise public 
awareness through education and “to ensure the effective investigation, prosecution and 
conviction of perpetrators,” the situation has not yet dramatically improved. 
In accordance with the current legislation, the abduction of a girl under seventeen years old for 
forced marriage is defined as a crime in Articles 154 (2) and 155 (2) of the Criminal Code of 
Kyrgyzstan. In 2013, sentencing guidelines were increased to a maximum ten years’ 
imprisonment for the abduction for forced marriage of a person under the age of seventeen and to 
seven years’ imprisonment for the kidnapping of a person over that age. Nevertheless, both 
Article 154 and Article 155 allow payment of a fine in lieu of imprisonment. Rape is punishable 
by five to eight years’ imprisonment according to Article 129. Marital rape is not specifically 
criminalized and remains unpunished. 
Prosecutions for bride kidnapping have been rare, and only a few cases of bride abduction 
are officially registered. For instance, from 2013 through 2018, out of 895 registered reports and 
statements, 727 (or 81.2 percent) went uncharged. Government prosecutors sought convictions in 
only 168 (or 18.7 percent) of complaints. As the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women concluded in its inquiry concerning Kyrgyzstan in September 2018, deep-rooted 
patriarchal attitudes and cultural stereotypes remain the main issue as police officers “often 
discourage victims from filing a complaint and sometimes are under pressure from within their 
communities or receive bribes so as not to investigate reports of bride kidnapping.” Bribery is 
prevalent to avoid investigation or prosecution. Hence, the laws are no more than symbolic so 
long as the pattern of socially legitimizing bride kidnapping and allowing perpetrators to act with 
impunity remains. 
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Kyrgyzstan has been ordered to report back to the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women by March 2019. As explained in the Committee’s General 
recommendation No. 28 on the core obligations of State parties under Article 2 of 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women—which 
Kyrgyzstan ratified in 1997—“State parties have an obligation not to cause discrimination 
against women through acts or omissions . . . [and] to react actively against discrimination 
against women, regardless of whether such acts or omissions are perpetrated by the State or by 
private actors.” Therefore, by failing to take sustained measures to protect women from bride 
kidnapping, Kyrgyzstan acts in violation of Articles 2, 5, 10, and 16 of the Convention that 
specifically include the elimination of harmful cultural practices and stereotypes in collaboration 
with the educational system, the media, and society overall. Under Articles 1, 2, 12, and 16, 
Kyrgyzstan is also obligated to provide ex officio prosecution of perpetrators of bride 
kidnapping, to eliminate the option of paying fines to avoid imprisonment, and to criminalize 
subsequent marital rape. Failure to criminalize marital rape denies victims legal protection 
against rape within forced marriage. In addition, Articles 2, 5, 12, and 15 obligate Kyrgyzstan to 
ensure that victims of bride kidnapping have access to effective remedies, appropriate protection, 
and support services. In particular, the Articles call for legal aid and well-equipped shelters, 
where women can remain during and after legal proceedings. 
Kyrgyzstan promotes a culture that bestows all power on men and that exercises willful 
blindness on bridal kidnapping—abusive cultural practices that invite human rights violations 
but are considered part of Kyrgyzstan’s cultural identity and ideals of masculinity. Although 
legislative frameworks can be amended in the blink of an eye, changing the social perception of 
a women’s place in the modern Kyrgyz society in order to meet human rights obligations, has a 










Twelve Years Old, Detained, and 
Imprisoned: President Duterte's Solution to 
End the Drug War in the Philippines 
 
March 18, 2019 
by Kate Juon  
President Rodrigo Duterte has been on a mission to eradicate drug users and traffickers—and 
now his administration has set its sights on children. On January 28, 2019, the House of 
Representatives approved a bill to lower the minimum age of criminal liability from fifteen years 
old to nine years old. However, due to backlash from many child rights advocacy groups and 
religious organizations, Philippine lawmakers “compromised” to a minimum age of twelve. 
Currently under Section 6 of the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (“Juvenile Act”), 
children as young as twelve can be subject to mandatory confinement in Bahay Pag-Asa or 
“House of Hope” Centers. Regarded as twenty-four-hour child care institutions with special 
child-focused rehabilitation programs, these centers are in reality overcrowded detention 
centers for children ages twelve to eighteen or even adults as old as twenty-eight. Children are 
detained alongside adults as centers become more and more overcrowded. Without proper food, 
services, or beds, these centers are already stretched thin for currently incarcerated children. Yet, 
the government wants to add children ages nine to fourteen to an already inhumane environment. 
Since President Duterte took office, his administration has been on a deliberate and ruthless 
antidrug campaign. Its mission has been to “slaughter them all” which has already claimed 
an estimated twenty thousand lives. This number includes dozens of children who are being 
caught in the crossfire of the drug war. Without any regard to human life, Duterte calls these 
children “collateral damage” as the government continues to kill during the course of supposed 
anti-drug operations. 
This goes beyond a violation of the UN Convention on the Rights of Children. The International 
Criminal Court (ICC) has even recently launched a preliminary examination of Duterte’s drug 
war concerning alleged crimes against humanity. Though Duterte has since announced that 
the Philippines will be pulling out from the ICC’s Rome Statute that grants the ICC jurisdiction 
over crimes against humanity, and he remains adamant that this drug war is a “legitimate police 
operation,” evidence of deliberate killing of drug users as opposed to drug traffickers paints a 
different picture. 
The administration states that the main motivation for this bill is to deter adult offenders from 
abusing children as the current law allegedly incentivizes drug gangs to use children “because 
they know the children will be freed.” Though children under fifteen were indeed freed before 
the January 2019 bill was approved, the current administration has always held the child 
responsible. The Juvenile Act does state that anyone who exploits a child shall be imposed a 
maximum penalty; however, the onus remains on a child and their own actions. Such laws 
completely ignore the fact that children even at fifteen do not possess the maturity to 
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comprehend what they have done or understand the consequences to their decisions. Many 
countries recognize that a child does not reach the legal age of majority or age to give consent 
and take on social responsibilities until at least sixteen, yet the Philippine government ignores 
this widely recognized truth. Oddly, the government has acknowledged that the age of civil 
responsibility concerning marriage or the creation of a contract is eighteen, but it holds a child 
legally responsible for any criminal actions at twelve. 
As a party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”), the Philippines must  protect 
the child who is, as defined by the Convention, below the age of eighteen. As it states, a child, 
“by reasons of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care,” and State 
Parties must under Article 19 take all “appropriate legislative, administrative, social and 
educational measures to protect the child” and to provide support and care. Yet, the Philippines 
had been proposing that children as young as nine—with a “compromise” to increase the age to 
twelve—be convicted and imprisoned until they can be sentenced at age twenty-five. Not only 
does this directly violate CRC Article 37 against detention and punishment, but some critics 
believe that this bill will actually cause children to become “well-trained criminals” as they grow 
up in prisons. 
As this war continues to rage on with other leaders like Donald Trump applauding Duterte’s 
“success” eradicating drugs from the community, the Filipino children are most harmed as they 
face abuse from perpetrators and the government alike. With nearly thirty-one percent of 
children living below the basic needs poverty line, many of these exploited children are helpless 
as the country further enables many to turn to illicit means to make ends meet. The fact that 
Duterte and his allies believe the next step is to lower the age of criminal liability further shows 










Compacts of Free Association in FSM, RMI, 
and Palau: Implications for the 2023-2024 
Renewal Negotiations 
 
March 18, 2019 
by Erin Thomas* 
Introduction 
The Compacts of Free Association (COFA) with the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), 
Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), and Palau have shaped political, economic, and social 
possibilities for the freely associated states and for the role of the United States in the region. In 
1986, when the agreements were initially negotiated, they were a route to independence for 
FSM, RMI, and Palau. The upcoming renewal negotiations will be affected by the greater 
political autonomy of the freely associated states. This article highlights the important 
ramifications for the COFAs around human rights, migration, and economic assistance leading 
up to the 2023-2024 renewal negotiations. 
Background 
The Compacts of Free Association are the political association agreements between the United 
States and three countries in the Pacific Islands: Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), the 
Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), and the Republic of Palau. Historically, these states, 
along with other territories in the region of Micronesia, faced several forces of economic, 
political, and military colonization. After World War I, the region as a trust territory was 
administered by Japan. From 1947 to 1994, the region, as the UN Trust Territory of the Pacific 
Islands (TTPI), was granted to the United States.[1] With the Cold War raging on, U.S. territory 
in Micronesia became a prime location to exert U.S. military power. It also became the site of the 
largest nuclear weapons testing program in the world, with over 67 weapons detonated and tested 
with results upwards of 1000 times more powerful than the atomic bomb dropped in 
Hiroshima.[2] 
There are two separate COFA agreements, one between the United States, FSM, and RMI, and 
one between the United States and Palau. The agreements were an opportunity for the United 
States to maintain strategic influence in the region while supporting the self-determination and 
economic self-sufficiency of FSM, RMI, and Palau. They effectively ended the TTPI and granted 
independence to the island states. The agreements span government, economic, and defense 
relations between the United States and the freely associated states. The provisions are similar 
across the agreements (see Figure 1). 
The COFAs with RMI and FSM will be up for renewal in 2024 and the COFA with Palau in 
2023.[3] It has been over thirty years since the initial negotiations, and the dynamics during the 
upcoming negotiations will be different. The rising influence of China reinforces the strategic 
importance of the islands, and the trade-offs for the freely associated states under the current 
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agreements show that there are possibilities beyond the current terms. The agreements have 
shaped political, economic, and social realities for the freely associated states and for the role of 
the United States in the region. 
FSM, RMI, and Palau all have had different experiences under the COFAs, but many have been 
shared, especially considering the similarities between the agreements. This article will explore 
the issues thematically with examples from all three states, highlighting key issues of human 
rights, migration, and economic assistance for the upcoming renewal negotiations. 
 
Human Rights and Legal Fallout 
Human rights are a pressing concern in the freely associated states, especially relating to the U.S. 
military. After World War II, the islands became testing grounds for some of the most powerful 
nuclear weapons in the world. The testing occurred mainly in RMI from 1946 to 1958.[4] 
Although the U.S. military took some steps to move islanders out of harm’s way, the impact on 
communities is embedded in historical memory, and the lack of reparations has continued to 
affect RMI. [5] In addition to displacement and its long-term effects, the radiation has had long-
lasting health impacts on the population. A high proportion of cancer diagnoses in the Marshall 
Islands are related to radiation.[6] Food and water sources were also contaminated, forcing many 
Marshallese to become dependent on food imports from the United States. As opposed to 
traditional food sources and agriculture, food imports are linked to higher rates of obesity, which 
is a risk factor for further negative health outcomes.[7] 
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Section 177 of the COFA created the Nuclear Claims Tribunal (NCT), which intended to remedy 
all past, present, and future effects of the U.S. nuclear testing program.[8] Nearly $2.4 billion[9] 
has been awarded in claims through the NCT, but only a small fraction of that has been paid out 
to claimants.[10] In fact, the NCT ran out of funds in 2010. Many individuals whose claims were 
awarded have died without receiving compensation, and many of the NCT’s records have been 
jeopardized since it became defunct.[11] Since then, archivists from Switzerland and Spain have 
been working to preserve the records, which will likely be released before 2020.[12] “Compared 
to the nearly $1.2 trillion that will be spent on modernizing the U.S. nuclear forces, the payout 
for remaining awarded claims from the Nuclear Claims Tribunal would be miniscule.[13]” 
In 2014, the Marshall Islands sought justice at the International Court of Justice by arguing that 
the signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) were not 
making efforts to disarm.[14] The case was dismissed on grounds similar to that of other cases 
relating to nuclear weapons, and the United States was not even a respondent because the 
government does not recognize the ICJ.[15] In 2017, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals heard 
another case from the Marshall Islands against U.S. nuclear proliferation, but it was ruled outside 
of the jurisdiction of the domestic courts.[16] The ICJ case showed that there is a space to be 
heard on these issues at an international level, but a path to non-proliferation, particularly from 
the United States, appears unlikely. 
 
Little has been done by the United States to resolve the lasting environmental degradation, 
negative health outcomes, and distrust caused by the nuclear testing program. Even beyond 
nuclear testing, there is still World War II wreckage across the Pacific that only the United States 
and Japan have access to. The United States has taken minimal action in preventing dangerous 
leakages from the hundreds of wrecks in the Pacific.[17] 
Further, the impact of climate change cannot be understated. Carbon emissions from wealthy 
states like the United States have caused disproportionate harm to the land, air, and sea in 
Micronesia. This injustice extends far beyond the end of nuclear testing and continues to threaten 
livelihoods and human rights. 
The UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and toxic waste visited RMI and remarked that “the 
deep fissure in the relationship between the two Governments presents significant challenges; 
nonetheless the opportunity for reconciliation and progress, for the benefit of all Marshallese, is 
there to be taken.”[18] 
The “Compact Impact” and Migration Policy 
The COFA migration policy, which allows citizens of the freely associated states to live and 
work in the United States with some restrictions, is a key feature of the agreements. In fact, the 
RMI Ambassador has said that the Compact would not have been amenable without it.[19] There 
has been significant out-migration since the agreements were enacted. The trend is likely to 
continue with climate change as a push factor[20], and renewal negotiations cannot undermine the 
importance of the migration provisions for the freely associated states. 
The majority of COFA migrants have gone to other U.S. insular areas including Guam, 
American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), but a 
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number have also gone to Hawaii and the mainland.[21] Figure 2 highlights overall migration 
patterns, with FSM having the highest proportion of overall migration. 
Migration is an important option for citizens of the freely associated states for complex and 
interconnected reasons like family reunification, economic opportunities, healthcare access, and 
environmental degradation among others. The U.S. government tends to see reducing 
immigration from the freely associated states as the only solution with only two options: 1) make 
immigration more challenging for COFA migrants or 2) improve development outcomes in 
freely associated states to prevent out-migration.[22] The reality is that the migration provisions in 
the COFAs are important to the freely associated states, and threatening them could undermine 
the future of the agreements. 
 
The United States should instead protect migration from the freely associated states, and there 
are plenty of opportunities to do so. For example, the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Act made COFA migrants ineligible for Medicaid, which has had serious impacts 
on healthcare for low-income COFA migrants and the jurisdictions in which they live that are 
bearing the financial burden.[23] “The cost education and health services for migrants from freely 
associated states is estimated at $2.1 billion. Only $409 million (less than 20 percent) of those 
costs were supported by Compact Impact funds.”[24] 
Further, climate change will be an increasing factor in driving migration, especially from the 
Pacific.[25] In the freely associated states, migration is not viewed as the sole solution to climate 
change, but as islands become uninhabitable, it will become an important option. In the absence 
of protections for climate migrants, these existing pathways must be protected. 
Economic Assistance 
A major goal of the Compacts is to advance economic growth and self-sufficiency for the freely 
associated states. Economic assistance from the U.S. comes in three main forms: 1) access to 
selected U.S. programs and services, 2) direct economic assistance, and 3) contribution to trust 
funds.[26] Since the COFAs were implemented, economic growth has not followed expected 
trajectories. U.S. negotiators have attributed this to a lack of accountability and oversight of 
funds. 
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The original goal of the agreements was to support FSM, RMI, and Palau with the economic 
assistance tapering into only trust fund access after 2024 (2023 for Palau). The problem with this 
arrangement is that the unreasonable goal of total self-sufficiency for any economy creates 
indefinite dependency on economic support. Instead, economic assistance should be tailored to 
support the domestic economies of the freely associated states in a way that meaningfully 
promotes their political autonomy.[27] Past actions have worked in the opposite direction to erode 
trust between the U.S. and freely associated states. 
The 2003 amended agreement for FSM and RMI established oversight committees to address 
these concerns. The Joint Economic Management Committees (JEMCO) in FSM and the Joint 
Economic Management and Fiscal Accountability Committee (JEMFAC) in RMI were created 
consisting of three U.S. representatives and two from either the FSM or RMI, respectively.[28] 
Although accountability is an important goal for any funding mechanism, the committee 
functions more as U.S. oversight than a supportive partnership.[29] 
“The goal of self-sufficiency should be suspect when other, far more richly endowed territories 
are not self-sufficient and do not really aspire to self-sufficiency. Self-sufficiency is not its own 
reward. It makes little sense to argue that the poor should learn to be self-sufficient if the rich 
continue to be supplied and subsidized in one way or another by the prevailing social system.”[30] 
Funding arrangements and a lack of U.S. accountability have impacted the trust between 
respective governments, particularly with Palau. In 2010, the Compact Review Agreement was 
signed by both the U.S. and Palau governments, which would extend economic assistance after 
the 2009 expiration. Despite several attempts, the funding was not actually approved by 
Congress until the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), eight years later. From 
2010 to 2018, funding was appropriated by Congress at a lower rate than agreed upon, and there 
were no contributions to the trust fund or adjustments for inflation in the meantime.[31] 
Resistance 
Ahead of the renewal negotiations, the NDAA authorized a comprehensive assessment of the 
strategic importance of the freely associated states to the United States. Given the rise of China 
and the geopolitical significance of the islands, the U.S. government will likely confirm the 
importance of the islands to the strategic goals of the United States. However, the 2023 and 2024 
renewal negotiations will be much different than they were in 1986. 
In 1986, the COFAs were, in effect, the only route to independence for FSM, RMI, and Palau. 
The trade-offs in the upcoming renewal negotiations will be an exercise of greater political 
autonomy and agency for the freely associated states. Their governments and civil societies have 
shown reservations about certain pieces of the COFAs, including the presence and actions of the 
U.S. military. Even during the initial COFA negotiations, civil society resistance in Palau 
delayed the agreement until 1994.[32] 
The freely associated states have concerns and potential to pivot from the existing agreements 
given there are alternatives to renewing the COFAs. As explained above, the awarded claims 
from the Nuclear Claims Tribunal have still not been paid to the Marshallese. The coveted 
immigration provisions are being restricted in new ways; for example, legal precedent and 
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COFA terms reinforce the Attorney General’s ability to deny entry to anyone likely to broadly 
become an expense to the public.[33] Even the economic assistance, in its inconsistency, has 
eroded the trust of the freely associated states’ governments, with U.S. congressional 
authorization taking up to eight years. 
Despite their complex political arrangements, the freely associated states are sovereign, 
independent states. At the UN General Assembly in 2014, the call to action on climate change by 
RMI activist, Kathy Jetnil-Kijiner, inspired the first standing ovation in the hall since the late 
Nelson Mandela.[34] Leaders from both FSM and Palau have converted large parts of their 
exclusive economic zones (EEZs) to marine sanctuaries.[35] When China attempted to strong-arm 
Palau into ending their diplomatic ties with Taiwan through tourist restrictions, Palau President 
Remengesau responded that “it actually made us more determined to seek the policy of quality 
versus quantity.”[36] 
There are other actors involved as well, including rising donor countries like China and Japan 
which also seek access to the strategic significance of FSM, RMI, and Palau. For example, the 
Japanese government has responded to calls for clean-up of the dangerous leakages from World 
War II ships and airplane wrecks in FSM. The U.S. government has long resisted requests to 
remedy or claim responsibility for their dangerous wrecks in FSM waters.[37] COFA migration 
has also involved Hawaii, Guam, American Samoa, and CNMI, all of which will be affected by 
the outcomes of the renewal negotiations. 
Conclusion 
The 2023-2024 COFA renewal negotiations will be significantly different from the initial 
negotiations. The platform that the original COFAs built provided for the independence of the 
freely associated states. FSM, RMI, and Palau all have an unprecedented amount of political 
autonomy coming into the 2023-2024 COFA renewal negotiations that need to be recognized. 
Several pertinent human rights issues will be on the table alongside the broader questions of the 
future of these political relationships. 
The U.S. nuclear testing program in RMI and lack of reparations, among other human rights 
concerns in the region, has eroded trust in the U.S. government. With the Nuclear Claims 
Tribunal records being preserved, the unfulfilled claims will be a key point of debate given that 
the COFA responds to all nuclear claims past, present, and future. Additionally, the lack of 
protections for COFA migrants in the United States is concerning, considering that the migration 
provisions are integral to the freely associated states and are increasingly so with the threats of 
climate change. 
Economic assistance to the freely associated states has been questioned because it has not led to 
the intended economic self-sufficiency. A focus on how the governments of RMI, FSM, and 
Palau can take ownership of their domestic economies will reduce economic dependence. 
Funding oversight by the United States has been prioritized over partnership with the freely 
associated states, a method which would advance domestic ownership of economic policy. The 
financial management of economic assistance has illustrated distrust on both sides and a 
particular lack of U.S. accountability considering the substantial delays in funding authorization 
and payment fulfillment. 
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Although the U.S. military has been afforded strategic military denial in the region, geopolitical 
conflict in the region has sparked interest from other states including China, Japan, and Taiwan. 
These agreements are complex and contentious with an increasing number of interested parties. 
Far from guaranteed, the COFA negotiating tables will open the discussion on what the real 
impact of these political arrangements have been and what the future of the agreements could 
bear. 
*Erin Thomas is an Associate Advisor with the International Center for Advocates Against 
Discrimination. Her work is focused on human rights in the Pacific Islands, specifically gender-
based violence and sub-national island jurisdictions. She is currently finishing her Master’s 
degree at the University of Auckland in Development Studies.  
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Disproportionate Effects of Disaster 
Preparedness on Women: An Empowerment 
Approach in Fiji  
April 11, 2019 
by Kate Morrow 
Women are often left out of the conversations on disaster preparation and response. According to 
the United Nations (UN), women and girls experience greater “risks, burdens, and impacts” 
during and after disasters such as cyclones and extreme flooding. These risks include sexual 
violence and food insecurity, because of barriers to accessing health care, food and nutrition, 
water and sanitation, education, technology, and information in the aftermath of disasters. 
Cyclone Winston, which hit Fiji in 2016, limited access to food and water, forcing women and 
girls to travel further to get daily supplies of food and water, exposing them to greater risks to 
their security along the way. Women’s needs have not been adequately included in disaster 
preparation, and thus, women are burdened with extra labor to account for their own needs and 
those of their families after disasters strike. The disproportionate burden of disaster preparation 
and response that falls on women threatens the realization of women’s rights, but communities 
have also used it as a catalyst for organizing around women’s empowerment. 
Fiji has been a party to and legally bound by the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) since 1995. Under Article 2, Fiji is responsible for all 
discrimination against women both by the government and by private individuals. Article 11 
protects the right to have the same employment opportunities as men and prohibits any 
discrimination in employment. Articles 7 and 14 require that women be included equally in 
policy planning, development, and implementation at all levels, noting the particular 
vulnerability of rural women and the need to support their inclusion. In 2018, the committee to 
CEDAW issued General Recommendation Number 37 on gender-related dimensions of disaster 
risk reduction in the context of climate change. 
General recommendations are treated as authoritative interpretations of a state’s obligations 
under CEDAW. The Recommendation encourages states to address gender issues in the context 
of disasters and climate change through three broad principles: (1) substantive equality and non-
discrimination; (2) participation and empowerment; and (3) accountability and access to justice. 
These principles can be measured by a variety of factors: discrimination in post-disaster access to 
food, water, and shelter, security from gender-based violence in temporary shelters and 
evacuation centers, representation in response planning, or even the normalization of skills like 
swimming and climbing as activities for girls. In its 2018 Universal Periodic Review (UPR), the 
UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women recommended that Fiji 
take steps to include women in disaster preparedness planning and strategy development. While 
General Recommendation Number 37 was passed after the 2018 UPR, many recommendations 
incorporated General Recommendation Number 37’s second principle of participation and 
empowerment. 
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After natural disasters, Fijian women’s unpaid work increases while their autonomy decreases, as 
they tend to be the people finding resources and caring for families. Further, women have been 
excluded from policy development for disaster preparedness, so their needs have not been 
adequately addressed or met. Over two years after the devastation of Cyclone Winston, mud crab 
fishers, which are predominantly women, are still feeling the effects of the disaster in the size 
and number of mud crabs they are able to catch. Other women stopped fishing for crabs 
altogether, citing reasons such as needing to rebuild and repair homes or fallen trees blocking 
their access to the mangroves where the crabs live. Women were unable to access paid 
employment because the bulk of the rebuilding and recovery work fell to them. The implicit 
discrimination that forces women to take on a heavier burden in post-disaster rebuilding is a 
violation of Fiji’s obligations to eliminate discrimination against women, especially rural 
women, because it discriminates against women entering paid employment, guaranteed under 
Articles 2 and 11. 
While the government’s seeming inaction and indifference towards who is bearing greater risks 
and burdens in preparing for and rebuilding after disasters is a violation of its obligations, private 
community organizations are working through an empowerment approach to provide women 
with the skills and support they need to effectively join the conversation on disasters. One such 
organization, FemLINKPACIFIC, is a feminist organization that focuses on having a 
coordinated community approach to warning systems through radio and SMS communications. 
Through trainings, publications, and conferences, FemLINKPACIFIC focuses on using media, 
like radio, to voice women’s issues and needs in the planning and development process. 
FemLINKPACIFIC has successfully empowered women to participate in disaster-readiness 
planning. While they have been around longer than General Recommendation Number 37, they 
provide an example of how empowerment and participation can be used to advocate for women 
to be included in discussions and development on disaster preparedness and response. Using 
models like this, the Fijian government and other island nations can uphold their CEDAW 
obligations to ensure women are participating in decision-making under Articles 7 and 14 and 
actively work to mitigate, and eventually prevent, the disproportionate effects of disaster 






Australia’s Draconian Offshore Processing 
Policy: Crimes Against Humanity on Nauru 
and Manus Island  
April 14, 2019 
by Lucia Canton  
Over the past seventeen years, asylum seekers and refugees who arrive to Australia by boat are 
prohibited from entering and accessing asylum procedures on the mainland. Instead, they are 
sent by boat to Australia’s offshore detention centers located on the island nation of Nauru and 
on Manus Island in Papua New Guinea (PNG). Families with woman and children who arrive by 
boat are sent to Nauru, while male refugees and asylum seekers arriving alone are sent to Manus 
Island. Men, women, and children are sent to these islands for “offshore processing,” a harsh 
dysphemism, because upon arriving to Nauru and Manus, they are exposed to appalling 
conditions and held under arbitrary and indefinite detention. These detention centers have 
become notorious for their inhumane conditions and several organizations, such as the UN and 
Amnesty International, have documented various human rights violations occurring on both 
islands. Conditions are dire, resulting in widespread physical and mental suffering amongst 
detainees and causing what experts described as “epidemic levels” of self-harm with children as 
young as ten-years-old attempting suicide. By enforcing this offshore processing policy, the 
Australian government has not only violated several international human rights treaties, 
including the Convention on the Rights of a Child and the Convention Against Torture, but it 
has  also committed crimes against humanity, within the jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), against refugees and asylum seekers in these offshore detention centers. 
Australia experienced its first big wave of boat arrivals by refugees and asylum seekers in the 
1970s, when half of the Vietnamese population was displaced during the aftermath of the 
Vietnam war. The Australian public initially received these arrivals with sympathy, but increased 
numbers of refugees quickly became a main political issue and a dominant topic in the news with 
widespread claims that Australia was losing control of migrant selection by allowing individuals 
who arrived by boat to stay in the country. In 1999, another wave of asylum seekers, who were 
predominantly from the Middle East, arrived to Australia’s shores in much larger numbers than 
before. In response, the Australian government introduced its first offshore processing policy in 
September 2001, known as the Pacific Solution. This policy was designed to deter refugees from 
seeking safety on Australia’s shores by intercepting all boat arrivals at sea and sending refugees 
and asylum seekers to newly established offshore detention centers on Nauru and Manus Island. 
Over the following years, human rights groups widely criticized the Pacific Solution, claiming 
that the policy conflicted with international refugee law, was unjustifiably expensive, and caused 
detainees severe psychological damage. As a result, the Australian parliament announced the 
decision to end the Pacific Solution and close both offshore detention centers on February 8, 
2008. The abandonment of this offshore processing policy was short-lived, and the offshore 
detention centers were reopened in 2013 in response to another significant increase in boat 
arrivals, primarily from Syria. Since this reopening in 2013, succeeding Australian government 
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officials have continued to orchestrate a complex legal architecture aimed at legitimizing the 
indefinite detention of refugees and asylum seekers entering Australia by sea, hoping to deter 
more arrivals. Not only have Australian government officials failed to prevent or investigate 
human rights violations on these islands over the years, but they have used Nauru and PNG as 
scapegoats, attempting to avoid complete responsibility by concluding agreements with them and 
contracting with private corporations to run the facilities on these two different countries. 
There is sufficient evidence to support that the Australian government’s actions resulting in the 
offshore detention of thousands of refugees and asylum seekers may amount to the crimes 
against humanity of imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty, torture, rape, 
deportation and forcible transfer, and persecution, within the jurisdiction of the ICC. The Office 
of the Prosecutor of the ICC should exercise her authority and initiate an investigation into these 
crimes. Under Article 7 of the ICC’s Rome Statute, a crime against humanity occurs when an 
individual knowingly commits a specifically prohibited act "as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against any civilian population." The refugees and asylum seekers 
arriving to Australia by boat constitute a “civilian population,” which includes victims of a 
“widespread or systematic attack” as defined by the Rome Statute. 
Factual allegations about both locations claim that the offshore detention centers on both islands 
are inadequate, overcrowded, unsanitary, and overall extremely unsafe; the Australian 
government’s subjection of detainees to these conditions constitute severe deprivation of 
physical liberty or imprisonment. According to findings by the UNHCR, since the 2013 
reopening of offshore-processing on Nauru and Manus Island, the Australian government has 
forcibly transferred approximately 3,172 refugees and asylum seekers to these offshore facilities. 
In November 2016, the U.S. government agreed to accept some of the refugees on these islands 
for resettlement. As of 2019, the U.S. has resettled approximately 500 refugees from Australia’s 
offshore detention facilities; however, due to Trump’s administration policies, most Syrian, 
Iranian, Yemeni, and Somali refugees are not amongst those being resettled into the U.S. In 
November 2017, Australian authorities decided to shut down the Manus Island detention center, 
resulting in the forced relocation of male refugees and asylum seekers to three nearby locations 
on the island and heightening tension between these men and the local community, which 
responded with discrimination and violence. 
In July 2018, approximately 1,600 people were still detained on Nauru and Manus Island, 
including 850 men, women, and children on Nauru. Fortunately, in February 2019, the last four 
children held on Nauru were finally released and flown to the U.S. for resettlement; however, 
several men and women remain in offshore detention on Nauru. The release of these children, 
while an improvement, was long overdue and still no government officials have taken 
responsibility or been held accountable for these arbitrary detentions. 
Individuals detained at both locations were subjected to physical and sexual abuse, inadequate 
medical care and legal assistance, extremely severe mental health conditions, and insufficient 
access to food and water. This lack of sustenance, medical and legal aid, and the abuse 
committed against those detained at these offshore centers, amounts to torture, rape, and 
imprisonment or severe deprivation of physical liberty. In August of 2016, The Guardian 
published the “Nauru Files”, consisting of 8,000 pages providing approximately 2,000 leaked 
formal incident reports that were compiled and authored by security guards, teachers, and child 
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protection workers at Nauru’s Regional Processing Centre (RPC). These incident reports, written 
by the staff at the RPC, stem from contractual obligations between the Australian and Nauruan 
government, requiring that regular documentation and records be kept regarding the events 
occurring at the center in Nauru. The events mentioned in the reports include mental health 
issues, such as attempts at self-harm, and incidents of sexual assaults, child abuse, hunger strikes, 
physical injuries, and more. Additionally, a former Salvation Army employee, Nicole Judge, 
who was contracted to provide welfare services at the RPC on Manus Island, described the 
center’s conditions: 
“When I arrived on Manus Island during September 2013, I had previously worked 
on Nauru for one year. I thought I had seen it all: suicide attempts, people jumping 
off buildings, people stabbing themselves, people screaming for freedom whilst 
beating their heads on concrete. Unfortunately, I was wrong; I had not seen it all. 
Manus Island shocked me to my core. I saw sick and defeated men crammed behind 
fences and being denied their basic human rights, padlocked inside small areas in 
rooms often with no windows and being mistreated by those who were employed to 
care for their safety.” 
The Nauru Files and descriptions provided by welfare services paint an alarming picture of the 
inhumane conditions and practices that occurred at the Nauru RPC. 
Australian government officials, in partnership with corporate officers and government officials 
from Nauru and PNG, knowingly committed acts that amount to crimes against humanity, 
against thousands of refugees and asylum seekers who were in search of a safe haven on 
Australia’s shores. For years, these individuals have faced legal limbo under the uncertainty of 
their indefinite detention, while Australia’s government fails to appropriately address the 
atrocities occurring on these offshore facilities, despite widespread condemnation and thorough 
documentation provided to them. For these reasons, the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC 
should investigate and prosecute the government officials responsible for these crimes against 






Death by Stoning and Other Draconian 
Punishments Installed in Brunei  
April 27, 2019 
by Nicholas Ripley 
Brunei’s new criminal code legislates death by stoning for extramarital sex, anal sex between 
people of any gender, and abortion. It also codifies amputation of limbs for stealing and forty 
lashes by whip for lesbian sex. The Code makes consensual same-sex acts illegal and punishable 
by death and criminalizes transgender people by prohibiting gender expression associated with a 
different sex than one’s state-recognized binary gender. These punishments will also apply in full 
force to children who have reached puberty (called baligh), while younger children (above seven 
years old, called mumaiyiz) may still be subjected to whipping. 
In October 2013, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah first formally published the Syariah Penal Code 
Order. The order established a brutal new criminal law system designed to punish ideological 
morality crimes. It was to be installed in phases (likely in an attempt to temper international 
outrage), starting with fines and imprisonment and escalating to include amputation, whipping, 
and death by stoning. The implementation of the law was delayed after international outcry, but 
finally took effect on April 3, 2019. Now that it is in force, the new penal system is expected to 
target Brunei’s most vulnerable citizens; women, LGBTQ people, children, and the poor. 
Brunei is a small country on the north coast of the island of Borneo in Southeast Asia, bordering 
the South China Sea. The state is majority Muslim and ethnically Malay. Despite its size, Brunei 
is extremely wealthy due to its crude oil and natural gas production. It consistently ranks in the 
top five richest countries in the world and has the second-highest Human Development Index 
score among the Southeast Asian nations after Singapore. Ruled by an Islamic absolute 
monarchy under Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah, Brunei's ruling royal class enjoys a huge private 
fortune provided by the state. Hassanal Bolkiah has been in power since 1963 as the world's 
second longest-reigning current monarch after Queen Elizabeth. 
Hassanal Bolkiah is no stranger to problematic policy positions. During the Contra War in 
Nicaragua, Bolkiah played a significant role in funding the United States’ illegal 
interventionalism. America’s current special envoy for Venezuela, Elliott Abrams, convinced 
Bolkiah to wire ten million dollars to help the United States overthrow Nicaragua’s Leftist 
Sandinista government. This payment was ultimately sent to the wrong Swiss bank account 
number by mistake. 
Bolkiah also leads the Brunei Investment Agency which owns the Dorchester Collection, an 
operator of some of the world's most elite hotels, including the Dorchester in London and the 
Beverly Hills Hotel in Los Angeles. Despite Dorchester’s attempt to separate itself from the 
inhumane criminal policies of Brunei, a movement among celebrities has started to boycott 
Dorchester hotels because of their clear financial connections to Bolkiah. It is unclear whether 
the pressure from a highly-visible coalition of wealthy, secular, Neoliberal personalities will be 
sufficient to convince Brunei’s government to change course. 
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Brunei’s lack of transparency has made independent monitoring of human rights in the country 
difficult. It has had the death penalty in place since British colonization but has not carried out an 
execution since 1957, leading Amnesty International to declare the penalty “abolitionist in 
practice.” And while many citizens are fearful of the enforcement of the new penal code, there is 
suspicion that the new criminal penalties are a bluff designed to attract more investment from 
conservative Muslim markets. For example, the laws stipulate that acts of anal sex or adultery 
must be witnessed by four Muslim adults in order to be prosecuted. Still, gay dating in Brunei 
has reportedly come to a grinding halt, with people fearing entrapment by policemen pretending 
to be gay. Any enforcement of these laws, no matter how rare, would be devastating for human 
rights in the country and in violation of international law. 
The newly enacted penal code, according to Human Rights Watch, “is discriminatory on its face” 
and violates Brunei’s obligations under international human rights law, including the rights to 
“life, freedom from torture and other ill-treatment, expression, religion, privacy, and individual 
autonomy.” 
Brunei’s draconian punishments against women and children violate treaties to which Brunei is 
party, such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination 
of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women. The use of stoning and amputation in the penal 
system violates binding customary international law’s absolute prohibition of all forms of 
torture, and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. Brunei’s proposed use 
of the death penalty for “offenses” such as adultery and homosexuality is a form of arbitrary 
deprivation of life that violates Brunei’s international legal obligations as described by the 
United Nations Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 36, which states that “under 
no circumstances can the death penalty ever be applied as a sanction against conduct” that is 
protected by international law. 
In addition to new criminal laws dealing with sex and gender, Brunei has invoked the death 
penalty for “insult or defamation of the Prophet Mohammad” by both Muslims and non-
Muslims, which (along with the other new capital punishment crimes) violates the international 
principle that the death penalty should be reserved for only “the most serious crimes,” such as 
those involving intentional killing. Additionally, the criminalization of both Muslims and non-
Muslims for “printing, disseminating, importing, broadcasting, and distributing publications 
against Islamic beliefs,” Brunei violates the rights to freedom of expression and religion. 
The United States, Britain, France, Germany, the United Nations, and several human rights 
advocacy organizations have joined in condemning the new penalties in Brunei. So far, no 
sanctions, divestments, or legal challenges have been implemented. China, Singapore, Malaysia, 
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany (respectively) remain Brunei’s largest 
trading partners, making billions of dollars on exports to the country every year. If Brunei is 
making these changes to increase their foreign investments, maybe these countries should put 
their money where their outrage is. 
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Pakistan Establishes One of the Most 
Progressive Legal Protections for 
Transgender Persons in the World, But Who 
Does it Actually Protect?  
April 28, 2019 
by Kate Juon 
As the first Asian country to legally recognize self-perceived gender identity, Pakistan has 
become a pioneer of transgender rights in Asia. Unlike some other Asian countries where gender 
recognition is only adjudicated and decided by the courts, Pakistan has created “one of the most 
progressive laws in the whole world” concerning transgender rights. 
The Transgender Persons (Protections of Rights) Act was passed in March 2018, providing 
citizens the right to self-identify as male, female, neither, or a blend of both genders as well as 
protection, relief, and rehabilitation of their rights. The law expressly prohibits harassment of 
transgender persons, provides for the establishment of protection centers and safe houses, and 
also requires the creation of mechanisms for the periodic “sensitization and awareness” of public 
servants such as law enforcement and medical professionals relating to issues involving 
transgender persons. The comprehensive law even calls for the creation of special vocational 
training programs specifically for the vulnerable transgender community. 
The law provides hope in the transgender communities, but advocates know that enforcement 
and implementation will be very difficult. Although the preexisting social category, “Khawaja 
Sira” (transgender people), has existed for centuries in South Asian culture and South Asian 
society has traditionally venerated them as having spiritual powers, today transgender women 
have no choice but to seek shelter within aguru-chela system. Unlike a typical guru relationship 
where gurus act as a religious leader and the chela is a student or disciple, through this system, 
transgender women are mentored by a guru who pushes them to work as beggars, sex workers, 
and wedding dancers. Or many are denied jobs merely based on their status. The law specifically 
prohibits discrimination against transgender people, but what happens if the country does not 
accept gender and sexual orientation equality? 
Though officially outlawing public and private harassment and discrimination, violence and 
inequity remains within the communities. In 2018, the same year that the law was passed, there 
were 479 attacks against transgender women reported in one province, some ending in death. At 
least five hundred transgender people have been murdered since 2015; in 2017, a morgue refused 
to accept a body of a transgender woman because “it would make their freezers dirty”; and in 
2016, a transgender activist was shot six times and was refused medical services, causing her 
death. However, even after the law was passed in March 2018, violence has not ended as random 
attacks continue. In May 2018 a transgender woman was killed over a money dispute over Rs 
1,000 (US$9). In August 2018, a transgender woman was shot and dismembered. In September 
2018, a transgender woman was set on fire by men while resisting sexual assault. In January 
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2019, transgender people were gunned down by unknown assailants, killing one and injuring 
another. 
The treatment of transgender persons, specifically transgender women, is not surprising as 
Pakistan is a patriarchal country that continues to dismiss feminism as a threat to traditional 
social structure. Violence against girls and women are still on the rise as an estimate of one 
thousand “honor killings” occur yearly. Despite Pakistan’s ratification of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1996 and an emerging 
women’s movement to combat these backward laws and norms, violence and inequality against 
women are imbedded in its culture and tradition. Important to note is that Pakistan does not abide 
by Paragraph One of Article Twenty-Nine of CEDAW which protects its sovereignty against 
arbitration by a disputing party. Perhaps because of such a reservation, Pakistan’s 
“compliance”—or really its noncompliance—to CEDAW cannot be challenged. 
Despite the difficulties, some transgender people have begun to take a stand as they are going to 
the courts to petition for more protections from their communities. Many have begun running for 
office to introduce more empathetic legislation and push the four provincial governments to 
actually implement, adopt, and fund their own version of the 2018 law. 
Nonetheless, homosexuality is still illegal in Pakistan. This has affected the overall acceptance of 
the larger LGBTQ community. Though there are active, underground communities in Pakistan, 
being gay is not acceptable and can even be punishable by death. Islamic states like Pakistan 
have regularly justified human rights abuses against gay persons using religion, and continue to 
treat LGBTQ individuals as “abnormal and sub-human.” A leading Pakistani Islamic scholar, 
Imam Sahib, even described homosexuality as a “curable illness” and stated that he would advise 
a gay man who wanted to remain in Pakistan to live a secret life or leave the country of origin. 
This is the reality that the LGBTQ community faces. Though the Transgender Persons Act is 
impressive in its specifications concerning the protection of transgender persons, how will the 
lives of the LGBTQ community actually change? Despite instrumental changes that have 
allowed transgender persons to live freely as their true selves, the road to dismantle decades of 
stigma and prejudice at a national level will be difficult. If Pakistan remains committed to its 






Air Pollution in Ulaanbataar – a Human 
Rights Crisis in Mongolia’s Capital  
May 2, 2019 
by Valentina Capotosto 
Extreme air pollution in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, threatens the health and safety of almost half of 
Mongolia’s population. In May 2019, the Mongolian government will introduce a raw coal ban 
in multiple districts of its capital to reduce air pollution in its “ger” communities as part of its 
National Program for Reducing Air and Environmental Pollution (NPRAEP). In an October 
2018 keynote address, Daniela Gaparikova, the Deputy Resident Representative for Mongolia to 
the United Nations Development Program, described the air pollution crisis as a violation of the 
right to “a standard of living adequate for health” under Article 25 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR) and citizens’ “right to [a] healthy and safe environment and to be 
protected against environmental pollution and ecological imbalance” under Article 16.2 of 
Mongolia’s constitution. The air pollution crisis is a climate, health, and human rights crisis that 
could have implications under national and international law for violation of citizens’ 
environmental and human rights. 
A changing economy and climate have caused unexpected migration from rural communities to 
Ulaanbaatar. After transitioning from a soviet era command economy to a free-market 
democracy in 1991, caps on livestock and state support were removed from herding communities 
causing a sharp increase in livestock populations and subsequent pastureland degradation. 
Mongolia’s nomadic culture took a second hit when summers became drier, severe weather 
events became more frequent, and hundreds of bodies of water succumbed to encroaching 
desertification attributed to climate change. Rural influx to Ulaanbaatar quickly led to the 
unplanned “ger” communities dominating Ulaanbaatar’s northern district, which burns over one 
million tons of raw coal each year. 
Mongolia’s air pollution crisis is a health and human rights crisis. “Ger” communities burn raw 
coal in the winter months to survive temperatures sometimes hitting below fifty degrees 
Fahrenheit causing months of air pollution levels reaching as high as 133 times what the World 
Health Organization (WHO) considers safe. Ulaanbaatar’s almost 1.5 million residents endure 
months of exposure to high concentrations of pollutants small enough to “penetrate the lung 
barrier and enter the blood stream,” causing heart and lung disease, pneumonia, bronchitis, 
stroke, and impaired cognitive development in children. Pollution has become so severe that 
many families now send their children to the countryside during the winter. 
Mongolia has made past attempts at decreasing its air pollution concentrations under its 
Ulaanbaatar Clean Air Project (UBCAP) in 2012 and other international commitments under the 
UN Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC). According to the World Bank, air pollution 
declined in response to UBCAP measures until the 2015 financial crisis left enforcement of 
efficient stove and home insulation initiatives at a standstill. The 2017 NPRAEP, the newest 
initiative to combat air pollution, aims to overcome the financing issues of past programs to meet 
ambitious goals for air pollution reduction by 2025. In May, the coal ban takes effect in line with 
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a revamp of other initiatives attempting to curb air pollution. However, many in Mongolia are 
“skeptical that the Mongolian government will be able to enforce the ban.” 
Mongolia could face liability for its human rights crisis if it fails to mitigate its air pollution 
levels. An amicus brief by Human Rights Watch to the Supreme Court of Chile suggested that 
state and regional court systems have used international law as a guide to interpret and apply 
state constitutional provisions concerning environmental rights. The brief said that international 
frameworks, specifically the 2018 U.N. Special Rapporteur’s Framework Principles (Framework 
Principles), outlined obligations that could be “instructive to courts around the world.” 
The Framework Principles could provide guidelines for interpreting Mongolia’s basic 
environmental and human rights obligations. Under Articles 6.4 and 16.2 of Mongolia’s 
constitution, “the state regulates the economy . . . to ensure . . . social development of the 
population,” and citizens have a “right to [a] healthy and safe environment and to be protected 
against environmental pollution and ecological imbalance.” If a case were to be brought to the 
Mongolian court, the court could choose to use the Framework Principles to interpret its 
constitutional obligations pursuant to international law standards. Framework provisions such as 
the responsibility to “protect and fulfill human rights . . . to ensure a safe, clean, healthy, and 
sustainable environment” (Principle 2), to provide effective remedies for violations of 
environmental law (Principle 10), and to adopt international standards for air pollution levels 
from organizations such as the WHO (Principle 11, 33(b)) could be used by the court to interpret 
the state’s affirmative obligations to ensure social development, a healthy and safe environment, 
and protection from environmental pollution under Articles 6.4 and 16.2 of its constitution. 
If it fails to mitigate its extreme air pollution problem, Mongolia could face litigation for 
violating its citizens’ constitutional right to protection against environmental pollution and other 
affirmative obligations under the U.N. Special Rapporteur’s Framework Principles. The new coal 
ban effective this May will likely be watched closely and could be an important indicator of the 
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Introduction 
Since 2007, military use of educational institutions has been documented in twenty-nine 
countries – commonly in those countries which have been experiencing armed conflict during 
the past decade.[1] Educational institutions have been taken over by the military, partially or in 
entirety, in order to be converted into military bases, used for training fighters, used as 
interrogation and detention facilities, or utilized to hide weapons. Such occupation or use of 
educational institutions for military purposes and targeted violent attacks on educational 
institutions and their infrastructure disrupt education and expose students to the risks of death, 
injury, recruitment, and sexual exploitation. To prevent and discourage the military use of 
educational institutions domestically, there must be action at the international level. 
Given that the right to education is recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, a legal framework is 
needed to protect the right and recognize the repercussions of military use of educational 
institutions.[2] This article addresses the historical development of the international framework 
leading up to the Guidelines for Protecting Schools and Universities from Military Use during 
Armed Conflict (Guidelines) and the Safe Schools Declaration (Declaration) and argues for India 
to endorse these documents.[3] 
International Legal Framework 
The use of educational institutions by military in armed conflict was first explored as early as 
1935 in the Roerich Pact, which stated that educational institutions “shall be considered as 
neutral and as such respected and protected by belligerents.”[4] In international law, a deliberate 
attack on a school is prohibited and amounts to a serious violation of the laws and customs 
applicable in armed conflict. This is established in Article 52(2) of the Additional Protocol I to 
the Geneva Conventions (Articles), which recognized that “attacks shall be limited strictly to 
military objectives,”[5] and must comply with the rule of distinction and proportionality in an 
attack upon an object.[6] Additionally, international humanitarian law states that “intentionally 
directed attacks against buildings dedicated to education” constitute war crimes.[7] 
The Rules of the ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study (Rules) refer to rules 
that come from a general practice accepted as law, as opposed to treaty law. These rules are of 
crucial importance to today’s armed conflicts because they strengthen protections offered to 
victims by filling in the gaps left by treaty law. Rule 7 recognizes that “[t]he parties to the 
conflict must at all times distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives. Attacks 
may only be directed against military objectives. Attacks must not be directed against civilian 
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objects.”[8] Rule 9 states that civilian objects are not military objectives and schools are prima 
facie civilian objects, unless they become military objectives.[9] Further, under Rule 10, civilian 
objects, such as schools, lose their protective status when used for military purposes, such as 
being used to store artillery or to serve as a command post.[10] However, there is a rule of 
presumption that establishes that, “in case of doubt whether an object which is normally 
dedicated to civilian purposes, such as . . . a school, is being used to make an effective 
contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used.”[11] The objective of the 
rules referenced herein and the articles referenced in the paragraph above, within international 
humanitarian law, is to deter military use of civilian objects, including educational institutions. 
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has condemned military attacks on schools as one 
of the six grave violations affecting children most in times of war.[12] This classification forms 
the foundation that allows the UNSC to monitor, report on, and respond to abuses suffered by 
children during conflict.[13] Similarly, the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in 
Armed Conflict condemns “the targeting of children in situations of armed conflict and direct 
attacks on objects protected under international law, including places that generally have a 
significant presence of children, such as schools . . . ”[14] Additionally, Goal 4 of the 
Sustainable Development Goals 2030, entitled Quality Education, lists “[n]umber of attacks on 
students, personnel and institutions” as an indicator, addressing the need to safeguard education 
during armed conflict.[15] 
In January 2009, a United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child Report recommended 
that states “fulfill their obligation therein to ensure schools as zones of peace and places where 
intellectual curiosity and respect for universal human rights is fostered; and to ensure that 
schools are protected from military attacks or seizure by militants; or used as centres for 
recruitment.”[16] In 2011, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1998, which highlighted the 
implications of attacks on schools for the education, safety, and health of children and called for 
greater action to ensure schools would not be involved in armed conflict.[17] In 2012, in light of 
increased international attention, a coalition of United Nations (UN) agencies and Civil Society 
Organizations initiated consultations with experts from around the world to develop guidelines, 
for both government and non-state armed groups, aimed at avoiding military use of schools and 
mitigating the negative consequences of such use. 
In 2014, UNSC Resolution 2143 recognized the negative impact of attacks on education and 
raised the issue of engagement by member states of the Security Council in the formulation of 
concrete measures to deter military use of educational institutions.[18] The Guidelines and the 
Declaration, which were opened for endorsement at the Oslo Conference in May 2015, provided 
states with a voluntary, non-legally binding framework to formulate those deterrence measures. 
States that endorse these legal instruments demonstrate a political commitment to do more to 
protect educational institutions during armed conflict. This commitment was mirrored in UNSC 
Resolution 2225, which expressed “deep concern that military use of schools in contravention of 
applicable international law may render schools legitimate targets of attack, thus endangering the 
safety of children” and urged states to “take concrete measures to deter such use of schools by 
armed forces and armed groups.”[19] 
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The Guidelines, though not legally binding, specify that parties to an armed conflict should take 
all necessary measures to avoid impinging on the safety and education of children. The six 
guidelines urge states to commit to not using educational premises in support of military efforts 
and to extend such commitment to the premises even when the institution is not functioning due 
to the threat of active conflict.[20] An exception is carved out for extenuating circumstances, in 
which the premises must be utilized for only a limited time with no remaining evidence of use by 
military forces and availability for the school to reopen at will. States are urged to respect the 
civilian status of educational institutions and to disseminate and incorporate the guidelines into 
practice throughout the chain of command. It is also imperative for states to recognize that even 
if an educational institution has been converted into a military objective, it may only be attacked 
when no other alternative target is feasible. Consequently, states which attack and occupy 
educational institutions that have been converted into military objectives are also required to 
ensure that such premises are not used for purposes of their military personnel or activities.  
The Declaration which has been endorsed by eighty-four states as of February 2019, encourages 
state initiatives promoting and protecting the right to education and facilitating the continuation 
of education during armed conflict.[21] The Declaration highlights that the Guidelines draw on 
good practice within the international framework and provide guidance to reduce the impact of 
armed conflict on education. The Guidelines must be used as the focal instrument to construct 
domestic policy and operational frameworks, develop and adopt a conflict-sensitive approach to 
education, focus on continuation and re-establishment of facilities – as well as support 
international collaborative efforts and establish effective review mechanisms.[22] Further, the 
Guidelines provide impetus for states to collect data on attacks on educational facilities and 
victims, provide assistance to victims in a non-discriminatory matter while investigating 
allegations of violations of applicable laws, and establish monitoring and reporting mechanisms. 
Education Under Attack in India 
The Education Under Attack Report of 2018 provides an assessment of military use between 
2013-2017 of educational institutions in India, including: military use of educational institutions 
was responsible for damaging or destroying more than 100 schools; over thirty cases of 
abductions, targeted killings, explosive attacks and violent repressions of student protestors; 
higher dropout rates among girl students due to sexual violence; and increasingly common 
attacks on higher education due to rising tensions between student political groups in nexus with 
communal tensions leading to increased violence affecting academics and students.[23] 
In India, education is under attack primarily in the North-Eastern states, Eastern states, Jammu, 
and Kashmir. The country witnessed its highest rates of attack in 2013 during elections in the 
North-East and in 2016 during the violent protests in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. These 
areas are relatively more susceptible to disruption due to communal tensions and separatist 
movements which trigger unrest and require the intervention of the military.[24] 
India’s deviation from international law and policy protecting schools during armed conflict has 
led to many threats to education. India must create and implement a domestic legal framework 
that prevents armed conflict from affecting education.  
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Domestic Legal Framework 
As per Section 3(2) of the Manoeuvres, Field Firing and Artillery Practice Act, 1938, domestic 
legislation which deals with power exercisable for the purpose of manoeuvres, “[t]he provisions 
of sub-section (1) shall not authorise entry on or interference with any . . . educational 
institution . . . .”[25] Section 3 of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 
1952, states that where the competent authority is of the opinion that a property is likely to be or 
is needed for any public purpose, the property should be requisitioned by an order in writing. The 
provision states: provided that no property or part thereof . . . is exclusively used . . . as a school . 
. . or for the purpose of accommodation of persons connected with the management of . . . such 
school . . . shall be requisitioned.[26] 
The right to education is a constitutional guarantee under Article 21(A) of the Constitution of 
India when read alongside Article 41 pertaining to right to education as a Directive Principle of 
State Policy, Article 45 pertaining to free and compulsory education for children, and Article 46 
pertaining to the promotion of educational interests of the weaker sections of the 
society.[27] The domestic laws discussed above display the inadequate scope of protection 
provided to education in general, as well as to educational institutions. They present a vacuum in 
comparison with international law; several of the relevant international instruments have not 
been endorsed by India, namely the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, the Rome 
Statute, the Guidelines, and the Declaration. 
Despite this vacuum, India remains bound by customary principles of International Humanitarian 
Law and obligations arising under ratified instruments, namely the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. In 
2010, the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights recognized these obligations, 
noting: 
Schools should never be used as temporary shelters by security forces. The National Commission 
for Protection of Child Rights is of the view that use of schools by police or security forces 
violates the spirit and letter of the Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act 2009 because it 
actively disrupts access to education and makes schools vulnerable to attacks.[28] 
Role of the Judiciary in India 
The Indian judiciary is playing a significant role in highlighting the responsibility of the police 
forces, military, armed groups, schools, students, teachers and educational personnel; identifying 
deficiencies in the law; and bringing state practice closer to international standards. In Inqualabi 
Nauzwan Sabha v. The State of Bihar, it was noted: 
What is being complained of is that the police has occupied the building of the school with the 
result that the children are not being sent to school where the police has occupied the classrooms. 
This is depriving the children of education. The correct perspective would be that the police may 
remain within the district; but, the schools should not be closed for the reason that the classrooms 
have been converted into barracks. Why should this happen? This is depriving a generation and a 
class of children from education to which they have a right.[29] 
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Further, in Paschim Medinipur Bhumij Kalyan Samiti v. West Bengal, the state requisitioned 
twenty-two schools to accommodate police forces deployed there to cope with the tensions in the 
region. Though ten schools had been handed over, the state was directed to give up possession of 
the remaining schools that had been requisitioned within a period of one month.[30] 
In Exploitation of Children in Orphanages in the State of Tamil Nadu v. Union of India, the 
Court noted that schools, hostels and children home complexes under the control of security 
forces should be vacated within a provided time period, and such premises should not be allowed 
to be used by such forces in the future for any purpose.[31] Further, the Court directed the 
Ministry of Human Resource Development to submit a list of all the schools and hostels that 
were occupied by security forces, while the Ministry of Home Affairs was directed to ensure that 
the premises were vacated by such forces. Similarly, in the decision of Nandini Sundar v. The 
State of Chhattisgarh, the Court held that security forces that had not complied with the direction 
to vacate all occupied educational institutions were provided one last chance to vacate through a 
stipulated time period.[32] 
International Concern over the Deviation of Domestic Laws in India from the International 
Legal Framework 
The deviation of Indian domestic laws from the international legal framework governing 
education under attack has also been a subject of concern in the international community. This 
can be noted through the concluding observations on the report submitted by India under Article 
8, Paragraph 1 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict, which reflected that the Committee was concerned at 
the deliberate nature of attacks on schools by non-state armed groups as well as occupation of 
schools by state armed forces. The Committee urged India to pro-actively undertake measures to 
prevent the attacks on, occupation of, and use of places with a significant presence of children, 
such as schools, in alignment with international humanitarian law. The Committee further urged 
India to ensure that schools were vacated in an expeditious manner and to take concrete 
measures to promptly investigate cases of unlawful attacks or occupation of schools and 
prosecution and punishment of perpetrators.[33] 
Further, the Committee on the Rights of the Child’s concluding observations on the consolidated 
third and fourth periodic reports of India noted, “[t]he Committee . . . calls upon the State Party . 
. . to take measures to . . . [p]rohibit the occupation of schools by security forces in conflict-
affected regions in compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law standards . 
. . .”[34] 
Recommendations to Ensure the Safety of Education in India 
In furtherance of the goal to promote and protect the right to education, even when under attack 
during situations of armed conflict, India should endorse the Declaration and commit to both 
incorporation of the framework of the Guidelines and intent of the Declaration into domestic 
policy.[35] Given that India has not provided explicit protection for the right to education within 
domestic laws and has neither ratified nor signed nor endorsed the relevant international 
instruments identified above, it is imperative for India to implement the international legal 
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framework and enact domestic legislation. The framework must expressly prohibit attacks on 
educational institutions; disseminate and build awareness on such laws, regulations, and policies 
which prohibit armed forces and groups from using the premises of such institutions; and ensure 
that all violators of international and domestic protections are held accountable. Further, in order 
to improve prevention, as well as response, India should establish a monitoring mechanism for 
reporting attacks on education, collecting disaggregated data, and provide training to all armed 
groups, schools, students, teachers, and educational personnel.[36] 
Local negotiations spearheaded by the government should attempt to further efforts at the 
international and national level through agreements providing educational institutions safe haven 
by declaring them politics-free zones, banning weapons, and providing a code of conduct for 
forces. Additionally, India should implement conflict sensitive education and curriculums to 
minimize the negative effects of attacks due to greater understanding among potential victims. 
Advocacy for the protection of education from attack should also be carried out at all levels with 
clearly defined objectives and with messages communicated to all relevant stakeholders.[37] 
While endeavoring to prevent, India must also be capable of response. Importantly, it is 
imperative for India to provide remedies for education-related violations which must be available 
and effective, including fair functioning of the mechanisms and assistance to all victims seeking 
access to such mechanisms without discrimination. Physical protection measures must also be 
implemented by India to shield potential targets and reinforce their protection, in addition to 
programs of alternate delivery of education to ensure non-interruption of education.[38] 
Conclusion 
Attacks on education have significant consequences both short and long-term. The military use 
of educational institutions during armed conflict harms the education system, educators, and 
students. Education is critical for the social and economic recuperation of a society in the 
aftermath of conflict and crises and is widely recognized as the foundation for other social, 
economic, and political rights. Possession and use of schools by the military impedes access to 
education and threatens future outcomes for children and society as a whole. By failing to 
incorporate international standards in domestic law, the right to education in India as guaranteed 
by the Indian Constitution is hollow. 
With the endorsement of an international legal framework, incorporation of international 
standards within the domestic framework and measures for protecting education and mitigating 
the effects of attacks, India’s legal framework will be capable of protecting education. India’s 
legal framework must not only expressly prohibit attacks on educational institutions but must 
also pave the path for the establishment of a monitoring mechanism, implementation of physical 
protection and remedial measures for victims of education-related violence, a conflict-sensitive 
curriculum, and dissemination of information and awareness regarding such laws. Such a 
framework shall then be reflective of the enabling capacity of education, which is necessary to 
empower access, capacitate meaningful participation in society, and promote respect for the 
dignity of all.[39] 
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